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that, due to the availability of an IDR plan, the non-discharge of a student loan can never
constitute undue hardship. 6 There is no statute or regulation that explicitly requires IDR plans to
be considered in student loan bankruptcy cases, however, the majority of appellate courts have
unanimously treated the availability of IDR plans as relevant in assessing undue hardship. 7
This memorandum addresses the relationship between the discharge of student loans in
bankruptcy upon a finding of undue hardship and the availability of an IDR plan. Part I outlines
two doctrinal tests used by courts to determine whether the repayment of student loans imposes
an undue hardship on a debtor. Part II then examines how courts have adapted the tests when a
debtor is eligible for an IDR plan, and the role eligibility plays in determining undue hardship
and the dischargeability of student loans.
I.

The Prevailing Standards for Determination of Undue Hardship
Although Congress created one legal standard for student loan discharge, two tests have

emerged to determine whether a debtor has proved undue hardship. Nine out of the eleven circuit
courts use the three-prong Brunner test created by the Second Circuit. 8 The Eighth Circuit is the
only circuit to formally reject the Brunner test by creating the “totality of the circumstances
test.” 9 The First Circuit has declined to adopt either test, but most bankruptcy courts in the First

See, e.g., Rutherford v. William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (In re Rutherford), 317 B.R. 865, 877 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 2004).
7
See Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 2013); Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713
F.3d 882, 883–84 (7th Cir. 2013); Coco v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance (In re Coco), 335 F. App'x 224,
227–28 (3d Cir. 2009); Roe v. College Access Network (In re Roe), 295 F. App'x 927, 931 (10th Cir. 2008); Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour),
433 F.3d 393, 402–03 (4th Cir. 2005).
8
See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987); see also., Oyler
v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005); Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400; Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys (In re Polleys), 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); U.S. Dep't of Educ. v.
Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155
F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305–06
(3d Cir. 1995); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136–37 (7th Cir. 1993).
9
See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003).
6
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Circuit apply the totality of the circumstances test. 10 This part outlines the doctrinal structure of
the two predominant tests for determination of undue hardship: the Brunner test and the “totality
of the circumstances test.”
A. The Majority Test: The Brunner Test
Most courts evaluate undue hardship under the three-prong test established in Brunner v.
New York State Higher Educ. 11 To receive a discharge of student loans under the Brunner test, a
debtor must establish the following three elements:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to
repay the loans. 12
Under the first prong of Brunner, the court will evaluate the debtor’s current standard of
living and determine whether forcing the debtor to repay the student loans will prevent her from
maintaining a minimal standard of living. 13 Generally, maintaining a minimal standard of living
means a debtor can afford “basic necessities.” 14 What qualifies as a basic necessity varies among
courts. Some courts take a more generous approach and allow expenses for transportation,
hygiene, and modest recreation. 15 Other courts adopt a narrower view and restrict necessities to
only food, clothing, housing, and medical treatment. 16 The debtor doesn’t need to show that
repayment of the loan would cause the debtor to live at or below the poverty level. 17 However,

See Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190–91 (1st Cir. 2006).
46 B.R. 752, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
12
In re Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See Kuznicki v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kuznicki), 483 B.R. 296, 300–01 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
16
See Crawley v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Crawley), 460 B.R. 421, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
17
See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 1995).
10
11
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the debtor cannot dismiss their loan obligation simply because repayment would require
significant personal or financial sacrifices. 18
If the debtor proves their inability to maintain a minimal standard of living, the court
moves on to the second prong of the Brunner test. 19 The second prong requires the debtor to
demonstrate that additional circumstances exist indicating “that [the debtor’s] state of affairs is
likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loan.” 20 A debtor
must show that extenuating circumstances affect their future earning potential and their ability to
make payments on the loan. 21 These circumstances must be unique or extraordinary and “may
include, but are not limited to, illness, disability, a lack of useable job skills, or the existence of a
large number of dependents.” 22 Most importantly, a debtor’s additional circumstances must be
beyond their control and not borne of free choice. 23
If a debtor can prove the second prong of Brunner, the third and final prong of the test is
an inquiry into whether or not the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the student loans. 24
When a debtor receives a student loan, they become obligated to make a good faith effort to
repay the loan in full. 25 Therefore, a court will evaluate the number of payments a debtor has
made on the student loan. 26 Making some payments can demonstrate good faith, but failure to
make a payment, standing alone, does not establish a lack of good faith. 27 Courts also
acknowledge that a debtor may not have the funds available to make payments. 28 In these

Id. at 306.
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2007).
23
Id.
24
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
25
See Roberson v. Illinois Student Assistance Comm. (In re Roberson), 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993).
26
See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007).
27
See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004).
28
Id.
18
19
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circumstances, courts have found a debtor’s efforts to defer the loan or enroll in a payment plan
sufficient to demonstrate good faith. 29
B. The Minority Test: The Totality of the Circumstances Test
In adopting the “totality of the circumstances test,” the Eighth Circuit articulated their
belief that fairness and equity require each undue hardship case to be examined based on the
unique facts and circumstances surrounding the particular bankruptcy. 30 In evaluating the totality
of the circumstances, bankruptcy courts consider: (1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably
reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and her dependent’s
reasonable and necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances
surrounding the particular bankruptcy case. 31 Under this test, if the debtor’s reasonable future
financial resources will sufficiently cover their student loan debt while still allowing for a
minimal standard of living, the debt is non-dischargeable. 32 Courts give special consideration to
the debtor’s present employment and financial situation, including assets, expenses, and
earnings, along with the prospect of future changes, positive or adverse, in the debtor’s financial
position. 33
The Eighth Circuit believed that requiring bankruptcy courts to adhere to the strict
parameters of the Brunner test diminished the inherent discretion Congress gave to courts to
determine undue hardship. 34 Use of the totality of the circumstances test has allowed bankruptcy
courts to consider various factors beyond the presence of excess income over expenses. 35 Factors
such as the effect refusing discharge has on the mental health of the debtor, the physical
Id. at 1312.
In re Long, 322 F.3d at 554–55.
31
Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
29
30
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conditions that impair the debtor’s ability to maintain employment, and a debtor’s good faith
effort to repay the loan. 36
II.

Incorporating an IDR Plan into the Doctrinal Tests for Undue Hardship
The U.S. Department of Education enacted regulations that allow student loan borrowers

to enroll in IDR plans. 37 IDR plans allow for the adjustment of monthly payments based on the
income of the student loan debtor. 38 Creditors frequently argue that, due to the availability of
IDR plans, the non-discharge of a student loan can never constitute undue hardship. 39 The
majority of courts reject the argument that IDR plans should preempt judicial determination of
the dischargeability of student loans. 40 Thus, it is important to examine how courts have
incorporated the availability of an IDR plan under the two doctrinal tests for undue hardship.
A. Evaluating the Availability of an IDR Plan Under the Brunner Test
For courts applying the Brunner test, the question arises as to which part of the test to
evaluate the availability of an IDR plan. The majority of courts have treated IDR as one factor to
consider in determining whether the debtor has made a good faith effort to repay the loans, thus
satisfying the third prong of the Brunner test. 41 A debtor’s willingness to participate in an IDR
plan can often demonstrate good faith. 42 The majority of courts do not require a debtor to
participate in an IDR plan to satisfy the good faith requirement, but a debtor’s failure to
participate in a plan is relevant. 43

See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Reynolds), 303 B.R. 823, 826–27 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2004); Limkemann v. U.S. Dept. of Educ. (In re Limkemann), 314 B.R. 190, 194–95 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
2004); Faktor v. United States (In re Faktor), 306 B.R. 256, 264 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004).
37
See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)–(e) (2018).
38
Id.
39
In re Rutherford, 317 B.R. at 877.
40
See, e.g., Hedlund v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 2013).
41
See, e.g., Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490, 500 n.7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2002).
42
See Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1310.
43
See In re Birrane, 287 B.R. at 500 n.7.
36
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Evaluating the availability of an IDR plan under the third prong of the Brunner test, the
bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas granted a discharge of student loan debt
despite a debtor’s failure to enroll in an IDR plan. 44 The court rejected the argument that failure
to participate in an IDR plan is per se bad faith. 45 Even though the debtor’s IDR plan would have
resulted in a zero-dollar payment plan, the court determined that a refusal to discharge student
loans would still result in an undue hardship on the debtor and her dependents. 46 While failure to
enroll in an IDR plan weighed against a finding of good faith, it did not outweigh other factors,
such as the debtor’s continuous efforts to seek deferment and forbearance of her loans. 47
A minority of courts will consider the availability of the IDR plan under the second prong
of the Brunner test, whether additional circumstances exist indicating that a debtor’s financial
condition is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period. 48 Taking this
approach, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas denied a debtor discharge of
her student loans. 49 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the availability of an IDR plan
allowing the debtor to make income-contingent monthly payments and canceling her loans after
twenty-five years. 50 For this reason, the court found that the debtor’s situation was unlikely to
persist throughout the foreseeable future, thus failing the second part of the Brunner test. 51
Adopting a similar approach, an Indiana bankruptcy court considered the availability of
an IDR plan under both the second and third prongs of the Brunner test. 52 In this case, a debtor’s

See Trejo v. Navient (In re Trejo), 17-42439-MXM-7, 2020 WL 1884444, at *10 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 15,
2020).
45
Id. at *9.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
49
See Hollins v. U.S. Dept. of Educ. (In re Hollins), 286 B.R. 310, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See Archibald v. United States (In re Archibald), 280 B.R. 222, 227–28 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2002).
44
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nonparticipation in an IDR plan weighed against a finding of good faith. 53 The debtor’s ability to
consolidate her loans over twenty-five years under the IDR plan prevented a showing of
“certainty of hopelessness,” the standard employed by the Seventh Circuit under the second part
of Brunner. 54 Since the debtor could afford monthly payments under the IDR plan, the court
concluded this was a practical alternative to discharge. 55
Finally, a minority of courts address the availability of an IDR under the first prong of the
Brunner test, whether the debtor can maintain a minimal standard of living. 56 Since payments
under an IDR plan are based on a debtor’s income, courts taking this approach often reason that
the monthly payments are unlikely to prevent a debtor from maintaining a minimal standard of
living. 57 This conclusion is common when a debtor’s enrollment in an IDR plan would result in a
zero-dollar monthly payment. 58 However, other courts have recognized that the formula for
determining monthly payments is strictly based on income and does not account for expenses
arising from dependents or medical conditions. 59 Thus, if a debtor cannot afford the payments,
some courts have also granted or upheld a discharge despite a debtor’s nonparticipation in an
IDR plan. 60

Id. at 229.
Id. at 228–29.
55
Id.
56
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
57
See e.g., Thomsen v. Dept. of Educ. (In re Thomsen), 234 B.R. 506, 512 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999).
58
See e.g., Thoms v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Thoms), 257 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001).
59
See, e.g., McLaney v. Ky. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re McLaney), 375 B.R. 666, 671–72, 678 (M.D. Ala.
2007).
60
See e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Durrani (In re Durrani), 311 B.R. 496, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004), aff'd,
320 B.R. 357 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
53
54
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B. Evaluating the Availability of an IDR Plan Under the Totality of the
Circumstances Test
When applying the totality of the circumstances test, the majority of courts have rejected
a per se rule that participation in an IDR plan is required to reach a finding of undue hardship. 61
Courts note that treating the availability of an IDR plan as outcome determinative would
effectively override the individualized determination of undue hardship mandated by Congress in
§ 523(a)(8). 62 Instead, under the totality of the circumstances test, the availability of an IDR plan
is one factor to consider in evaluating the totality of a debtor’s circumstances. 63
In Lee v. Regions Bank Student Loans, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of
the Eighth Circuit upheld a discharge of the debtor’s student loans. 64 The debtor, a single mother
of two children, owed over $47,000 in student loans and received no child support from her exhusband. 65 The bankruptcy court determined that under an IDR plan, the debtor could not afford
the monthly payments without causing undue hardship on herself and her dependents. 66 In this
case, the creditors appealed, arguing the bankruptcy court had failed to consider the IDR plan’s
availability adequately. 67 Affirming the discharge, the Eighth Circuit held that under the totality
of the circumstances analysis, the availability of an IDR plan should not be given undue
weight. 68 The court explained that while an IDR plan may provide temporary relief, it does not

See In re Long, 322 F.3d at 552.
Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(8) (2018).
63
See In re Long, 322 F.3d at 552.
64
See Lee v. Regions Bank Student Loans (In re Lee), 352 B.R. 91, 96–97 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006).
65
In re Lee, 345 B.R. 911, 913 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2006).
66
Id. at 914, 919.
67
In re Lee, 352 B.R. at 91.
68
Id. at 97.
61
62
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offer a fresh start. 69 Aspects of an IDR plan such as negative amortization and a potentially
significant tax bill are inimical to the goal of bankruptcy. 70
Availability of an IDR plan becomes more relevant to a totality of the circumstances
analysis when the size of the debtor’s student loan debt is the primary basis for claiming undue
hardship. 71 In Jesperson, the Eighth Circuit reversed a finding of undue hardship entitling a
debtor to a discharge of more than $350,000 in student loans. 72 In this case, the debtor had never
made any payments on the loans despite a monthly surplus of $900 in income. 73 Given the
debtor’s earning potential and lack of substantial obligations to dependents or mental or physical
impairments, the court concluded the only possible basis for granting an undue hardship
discharge would be the “sheer magnitude of his student loan debts.” 74 Because the debtor had an
income surplus sufficient to satisfy the IDR plan’s monthly payment, the Eighth Circuit reversed
the discharge. 75 The majority opinion in Jesperson does not stand for the proposition that a
debtor’s eligibility for an IDR plan automatically precludes an undue hardship discharge. 76
Rather, a debtor with surplus income sufficient to satisfy the monthly payment required under an
IDR plan is not entitled to a discharge. 77
Conclusion
When an IDR plan is available, creditors frequently argue that excepting a student loan
from discharge can never constitute an undue hardship. However, most bankruptcy courts have
reasoned that IDR plans do not automatically foreclose the opportunity of a “fresh start” through

69

Id.
Id.
71
See Educ. Credit Management Corp v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2009).
72
571 F.3d at 779.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 780–81.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 786–90.
77
Id.
70
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bankruptcy. Instead, courts continue to make determinations of undue hardship, treating the
availability of IDR as one factor in their analysis. When applying the Brunner test or the totality
of the circumstances test, courts typically focus on whether the IDR plan offers the debtor a
viable choice for repayment without causing undue hardship.
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